Showing posts with label Lederman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lederman. Show all posts

Saturday, March 19, 2016

New Book: The Ethics Rupture

The University of Toronto Press has published The Ethics Rupture: Exploring Alternatives to Formal Research-Ethics Review, edited by Will C. van den Hoonaard and Ann Hamilton. My chapter is entitled, “Ethical Pluralism: Scholarly Societies and the Regulation of Research Ethics.”

Saturday, August 22, 2015

Goffman Blames IRB, Again

Sociologist Alice Goffman claims that “IRB guidelines” prevent her from disclosing the location where she was interrogated by police.


[Paul Campos, “Alice Goffman’s Implausible  Ethnography,” Chronicle of Higher Education, August 21, 2015. (paywall)]

Friday, June 19, 2015

Goffman's Tightrope

Two new articles add useful context to the debate about Alice Goffman’s On the Run. Together, they show just how narrow a path Goffman was walking between privacy and verifiability, and between scholarship and good writing. I will address the IRB issues in a separate post.


[Jesse Singal, “The Internet Accused Alice Goffman of Faking Details In Her Study of a Black Neighborhood. I Went to Philadelphia to Check,” Science of Us, June 18, 2015.; Leon Neyfakh, “The Ethics of Ethnography,” Slate, June 18, 2015.]

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

NRC Report: Where's the Freedom?

My biggest disappointment with the new NRC report is its silence on the question of academic and personal freedom.

Friday, January 10, 2014

National Research Council Issues IRB Report

The National Research Council has issued its long awaited report, Proposed Revisions to the Common Rule for the Protection of Human Subjects in the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

[National Research Council. Committee on Revisions to the Common Rule for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Proposed Revisions to the Common Rule for the Protection of Human Subjects in the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2014.]

Thursday, December 15, 2011

Halavais Calls for "Open Publication of IRB Protocols or Ethics Reflections"

In an essay in Nature and on his blog, Alexander Halavais, president of the Association of Internet Researchers, calls for funders to require "the open publication of IRB protocols or ethics reflections."

[Alexander Halavais, "Social Science: Open Up Online Research," Nature 480 (8 December 2011): 174–175, doi:10.1038/480174a; Alexander Halavais, "IRBs and Clean Secrets, A Thaumaturgical Compendium, 8 December 2011.]

Monday, August 25, 2008

Can Satire Match IRB Reality? Comment on Lederman's "Modest Proposal"

The last entry in the PoLAR symposium for which I will offer comments is Rena Lederman's "Comparative 'Research': A Modest Proposal concerning the Object of Ethics Regulation."

Lederman, an anthropologist and sometime member of the Princeton University IRB, challenges the regulatory defintion of research: "a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge." She correctly notes that the definition was crafted to distinguish the practice of medicine from biomedical research. As she puts it,

U.S. human subjects research regulations (known since 1991 as the “Common Rule” but formally set in place in the early 1970s) derive from earlier National Institutes of Health guidelines based on specifically biomedical experience and ethical problematics. Their logic goes something like this: First, medical therapy is appropriately evaluated in terms of individual patient interests, because its central concern is the direct improvement of individual patient well-being. Second, medical research is appropriately evaluated in terms of society’s and science’s interests, because its central concern is the production of knowledge “generalizable” beyond individual cases. And third, although physical risks to persons are inherent in both medical research and therapy, the risks to individuals are qualitatively greater in research (where individual persons are not the central concern) than in therapy (where they are). Consequently, research needs special oversight. (312)


[It's worth noting that the research definition entered the regulations as a result of congressional mandate; the National Research Act of 1974 instructed the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to consider "the boundaries between biomedical or behavioral research involving human subjects and the accepted and routine practice of medicine." The result was the defintion of research now encoded in regulations.]

Lederman then explains that the boundaries between research and therapy remain fuzzy even for biomedical topics. A case study of an individual patient offers some contribution beyond therapy, but is it generalizable? What about quality improvement, like the Johns Hopkins checklist?

Finally, Lederman produces her "modest proposal":

If there are indeed other ways of knowing the world that are similarly entangled in the everyday but not yet benefiting from IRB oversight, doesn’t fairness dictate that all of these modes be surveilled in the same manner? What would happen if ethnographers made common cause—all in (or all out)—not just with ethnographically inclined sociologists, political scientists, religion scholars, and folklorists but also with urban planners, architects, engineers, literary and cultural studies scholars, and colleagues in college and university writing programs—all of whom are engaged in varieties of research-with-human-participants? (320)


She then goes on to note similarities between the methods of ethnographers and novelists, asking why the latter have not been swept into the IRB dragnet.

The problem with Lederman's self-described "parodic" comparison is that some regulators and IRBs are already enacting parody as policy. As Lederman notes, "IRBs are already involving themselves in the lives of writing teachers, journalists, and others who had not heard of “human subjects research” until their own work came under scrutiny." (324, n. 10)

Other countries have taken this further. The Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) observes that the British definition of human subjects research "could count poetry, painting and performing arts as research," then fails to offer a defintion of human subjects research that clearly excludes those endeavors. It then goes on to state that "the conduct of human research often has an impact on the lives of others who are not participants," raising the possibility that a novelist might violate Australia's ethical standards without even talking to anyone. (p. 8) More recently, in February 2008, a Canadian committee proposed adding a chapter on Research Involving Creative Practices to Canada's Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans. The draft chapter suggests that some creative processes are outside the purview of ethics boards, but it does not make a good case for any review of creative work, except that "researchers from a wide range of disciplines" would feel cheated if artists got special treatment.

It's too late for reductio ad ridiculum; the ridiculous is at the gates.

Like Bosk's essay, Lederman's expresses frustration with IRB oversight of ethnography without clearly calling for an end to such oversight, much less offering a strategy to achieve that goal. She reports, offhand, that when oral historians seemed to have escaped IRB jurisdiction, the anthropologists she knew "were briefly thrilled, but there was no notable effort to follow suit." (318) Why this passivity? I am less interested in why ethnographers have not made common cause with novelists than in why they have not made common cause with themselves.